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Belcher: Cramdown under the New Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Boon

Cramdown Under The New Chapter 12 Of The Bankruptcy
Code: A Boon To The Farmer, A Bust To The Lender?
The economic plight of the farm sector has created massive credit problems. In 1985, it was estimated that over 15 percent of all farmers could
not survive without financial reorganization.' This estimate included more2
than 229,000 farmers who owed more than one hundred billion dollars.
Congress, recognizing the size of the problem and the role that the
federal government played in contributing to the problem,' proposed legislation to assist the farmer in reorganizing under the Bankruptcy Code.,
Congressional proposals, hearings, and debates culminated with the enactment of Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986.'
This comment will review some of the issues Congress considered before enacting Chapter 12 for the "family farmer.' First, it will review
Congress' general evaluation of existing reorganization chapters in the
Bankruptcy Code, Chapters 111 and 13. 8 Next, it will thoroughly discuss
two specific protections available to a creditor in Chapter 11 and one available in Chapter 13. Chapter 11 includes secured creditor protection
through the section 1111(b) 9 election of the claim amount and unsecured
creditor protection through the Absolute Priority Rule.' 0 Chapter 13 protects mortgage lenders by precluding any modification of residential
loans." These protections are unavailable in Chapter 12. This comment
1. Farm Bankruptcy,Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand
Procedure,and Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 27 (Nov. 6 and 12, 1985) [hereinafter referred to as Hearingsbefore the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedure] (statement of Rep. Synar).
2. Farm Bankruptcy Amendments, Hearings on H.R. 1397 and H.R. 1399 before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary,House of
Representatives,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (March 27, 1985) [hereinafter referred to as Hearings on H.R. 1397 and 13991 (statement of Rep. Synar).
3. See Anderson, An Analysis of PendingBills to Provide Family FarmDebtor Relief
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 132 CONG. REC. S15,076, S15,076-77 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986)
(discussing the necessity for government-sponsored loan programs which encouraged borrowing because of their lenient terms); see also 131 CONG. REc. H4771 (daily ed. June 24,
1985) (discussing the effect on farm economics of governmental policies to boost the dollar's
value, fight inflation, and target commodity prices).
4. H.R. 1397 and H.R. 1399, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 705, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985).
5. Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3105-14 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§
1201-1231).
6. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 251, 100 Stat. 3088, 3104 (to be codified as amending 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(17)) (A "family farmer" is a farm operator with no more than $1,500,000 in total debt
with at least 80 percent of that debt arising out of the farming operation. Total debt excludes debt on a personal residence not part of the farming operation. Also, more than 50
percent of the operator's gross income in the year prior to filing for bankruptcy must have
come from farming.).
7. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985).
8. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (1982).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. I1 1985).
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will then analyze the effect of Chapter 12 on a secured lender. The analysis
will focus on a lender secured by farmland. The lender is "undersecured' '
because the farmland that once totally secured the debt has declined in
value to a point where the debt now exceeds that value. Further, the lender
is an "objecting"'" creditor, one who opposes confirming the debtor's plan
of reorganization. The lender's status, thus, requires the bankruptcy court
to "cramdown' '14 the debtor's plan. The lender's remaining protections
under Chapter 12 will be discussed in depth. Finally, some of Chapter 12's
effects outside of bankruptcy proceedings will be forecast.
BACKGROUND

Chapter 12 is not Congress' first attempt to initiate special bankruptcy
legislation to aid the failing farmer. In 1933, section 75 was added to the
old Bankruptcy Act" to provide relief from the Great Depression. 6 That
section, designed to be temporary, was extended because of World War
II. It eventually expired in 1949, 16 years after enactment. 17 The Chandler
Act, enacted in 1938, contained Chapter XIP8 which did not specifically
aid the farmer but was available for restructuring his finances. Chapter
XII saw little use due to post-World War II prosperity. 9 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 repealed all prior bankruptcy acts.2" It contains,
however, two reorganization chapters, Chapter 1121 and Chapter 13.22
CHAPTER 11

Before passing Chapter 12, Congress considered the use of Chapter 11
for farm reorganization. Chapter 11, however, contains provisions for a
creditor's committee. It requires preparation of and hearings on a disclosure statement. Creditors' approval and acceptance of a debtor's proposed
plan must be solicited. These requirements, which are time-consuming and
expensive, 2 are detrimental to the debtor and diminish farm assets.
12. L. LOPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS § 7.4.8, at
242 (1985) (defining "undersecured" as a creditor whose debt would be only partially satis-

fied if proceeds from the sale of collateral which was sold in a commercially reasonable manner were applied to the debt).
13. See id § 9.13, at 331, n. 1 (describing an "objection" to a plan as a legal basis requiring the bankruptcy court to refuse plan confirmation. That differs from "rejecting" a
plan which occurs when a creditor votes against a plan.).
14. See 3 D. COwANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 19.19, at 245 (1987 ed.} (stating that "cramdown" is required when a creditor does not accept a plan or rejects it outright).
15. Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 75, Pub. L. No. 420, 47 Stat. 1467, 1470 (expired
1949).
16. Anderson, supra note 3, at S15,077 (citing 10 H. REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE
(1947)).
17. Id at S15,077.
18. Chandler Act, ch. 575, §§ 401-526, Pub. L. No. 696, 52 Stat. 840, 916-30 (1938) (repealed 1978).
19. Anderson, supra note 3, at S15,080.
20. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
21. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
22. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
23. Hearings on H.R. 1397 and 1399, supra note 2, at 131 (reply letter from F. Kennedy, Univ. of Iowa law professor, to Rep. Rodino, chairman of the Committee on the
BANKRUPTCY LAW

Judiciary, House of Representatives).
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Chapter 11 also contains cramdown provisions which are extensive
and complex. 4 Those provisions are beyond the scope necessary to confirm a simple plan proposed by a typical farmer. Further, Chapter 11 poses
a risk that a creditor might propose a plan which liquidates the farmer. 3
That prospect is untenable when considering legislation to rehabilitate
the farmer.
Finally, and importantly, Congress considered the practicalities of the
typical farm debtor-creditor relationship. Most of a farmer's debt will be
held by a lender who loaned him money to acquire farmland or who took
farmland as collateral for other loans. Because farmland values have significantly declined, a lender who was once totally secured is now unsecured for a large portion of debt. Since Chapter 11 requires an affirmative
vote by certain classes of creditors to effect reorganization, 26 this creditor might dominate the vote of the unsecured class.2 7 This, alone, could
prevent plan confirmation and defeat the purpose of the reorganization
legislation.
CHAPTER

13

Congress, at the same time, reviewed Chapter 13 for farm reorganizations. Chapter 13's debt limit presents a significant obstacle to its successful use by farmers. Chapter 13 is available only if total debts do not
exceed $450,000.00.2a That limit is too small for many insolvent farmers.
Chapter 13, too, is only available to individuals." That limitation excludes
many farmers who have formed family partnerships or corporations. 0
Chapter 13 has several requirements that a farmer cannot practically meet.
Chapter 13, designed for wage-earners, requires plan payments to be made
within 30 days after the debtor files for bankruptcy protection. 1 A farmer's dependence on a seasonal harvest for income does not allow the farmer
to meet this payment requirement." Another significant Chapter 13 provision precludes a debtor from modifying the debt secured by his principal residence. Unlike wage-earners, a farmer lives on the land from
which he derives his income. The inability to modify his mortgage debt
will likely preclude a successful reorganization. Because Congress disallowed home mortgage modification in Chapter 13, it required all payments
to be made within the maximum three-year plan term.3 A normal Chapter
24. Id at 56 (statement of F. Kennedy).
25. See id at 131 (letter from F. Kennedy to Rep. Rodino.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
27. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedure, supra
note 1, at 165 (statement of A.Thomas Small, Bankruptcy Judge, E.D. N.C.).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982) (limits the availability of Chapter 13 to a debtor owing
less than $100,000 in unsecured debts and $350,000 in secured debts as of the date of filing
a bankruptcy petition).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982) (limits the availability of Chapter 13 to only an "individual").
30. Hearings on H.R. 1397 and 1399, supra note 2, at 89-90 (written statement of
H. Graves, an Oklahoma attorney and co-drafter of H.R. 1399).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
32. Hearings on H.R. 1397 and 1399, supra note 2, at 92-93 (written statement of
H. Graves).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(bl(5) (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1982).
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13 debtor has no need for a longer term since his only long-term debt is
his home loan. Allowing mortgage debt modification to a farmer, though,
requires a longer term to repay this mortgage debt. 5
CHAPTER

12

After considering the deficiencies of Chapter 11 and Chapter 13, Congress enacted a separate Chapter 12. This chapter was designed to overcome the deficiencies of Chapters 11 and 13 while preserving certain
creditor protections."
The Chapter 12 proposal received significant criticism. It reportedly
creates a legal atmosphere which encourages bankruptcy and discourages
a farmer's incentive to work out arrangements with his lender. 7 Without
lender participation in a plan, debtor-owned lenders will realize more losses,
resulting in higher interest rates to farm borrowers.38 Chapter 12 also imposes the entire burden of debt forgiveness on farm lenders, with no hope
of recovery. Debt forgiveness may reach billions of dollars. That massive
debt forgiveness may chill future agricultural loans.39
Despite this criticism, Congress enacted Chapter 12. While Congress
readily admits that this bankruptcy chapter will not solve the farm crisis, it is designed to give the farmer a "fighting chance" to reorganize
and stay on the farm. In the meantime, Congress plans to pass a farm
bill while reassessing tax and trade policies, all intended to revitalize the
farm economy.40 Its benefits reportedly extend to creditors and the general
public alike. Farm reorganization inhibits liquidation. Fewer farm liquidations will stabilize farm values and stop the erosion in lenders' collateral
values. 4' The American public benefits from retaining farm operations.
More farmers create more competition and lower food prices. Furthermore,
4' 2
Chapter 12 supposedly costs the taxpayer not "one red cent."
SIGNIFICANT ISSUES IN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

While working on Chapter 12, Congress considered two Chapter 11
protections that significantly affect an undersecured creditor. Those provisions govern the amount of the creditor's secured claim 43 and the re35. H.R. 1399 proposed a plan term of ten years. Even that longer term was criticized
as being too short for restructuring a farmer's long-term debt. Hearingson H.R. 1397 and
1399, supra note 2, at 77 (written statement of G. Paine, II, Bankruptcy Judge, M.D. Tenn.).
36. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedure,supra
note 1, at 183 (letter to Samuel Gerdano, counsel for the Subcommittee, from A. Thomas
Small, Bankruptcy Judge, E.D. N.C., and co-drafter of a proposed bill establishing Chapter 12).
37. 132 CONG. REc. S15,092 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
38. See Hearingson HR. 1397 and 1399, supra note 2, at 173-75 (letter from D. Banner, President of The Farm Credit Council, an association of borrower-owned farm lending
institutions).
39. 132 CONG. REc. S15,092 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
40. 131 CONG. REC. H4769 (daily ed. June 24, 1985) (statement of Rep. Synar advocat-

ing passage of H.R. 2211 which he co-sponsored).
41. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedure,supra
note 1, at 184 (letter to S. Gerdano, counsel for the Subcommittee, from A. Thomas Small,

Bankruptcy Judge, E.D. N.C.).
42. 131 CONG. REc. H4770 (daily ed. June 24, 1985) (statement of Rep. Synar).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (1982).
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quirement to pay unsecured debts in full before a debtor retains a property
interest in the reorganized business."
AMOUNT OF SECURED CLAIM
Section 506(a) defines a "secured claim" as the amount of the debt,
up to the value of the property securing the debt.4 5 In the case of an undersecured debt, the balance becomes an unsecured debt.4 6 The secured
claim amount is important in cramdown because secured creditors are
given certain protections. Chapter 11 contains a special provision giving
an undersecured creditor the option to elect a higher secured claim amount
than that contained in section 506(a). Section 111 1(b)(2) allows an undersecured creditor to claim the entire amount of the debt as its secured claim,
not limit it to the collateral value.' Its purpose was to overrule the result
of In re Pine Gate Associates.4' That case allowed a debtor to "cash out"
the objecting secured creditor's loan for merely the
value of the collateral
4
during a temporary period of depressed prices. '
Section 1111(b)(2) protects an undersecured creditor in two different
ways. If the undersecured creditor thinks the collateral is undervalued,
or if it dislikes the plan's treatment of its unsecured portion, it can make
this election. 0 This election treats the creditor's entire claim as a secured
claim."1 In a long-term plan, this election will not change the amount which
would be paid on the secured portion of the debt. 52 It will, however, alter
payments on the unsecured portion because the creditor's election waives
all payments on the unsecured portion of the debt. 3 The creditor, however,
retains a lien on the property for the full debt amount rather than for the
smaller collateral value.' If the property's appreciation is greater than
the plan payments the creditor would have received on its unsecured claim,
the lender will benefit from the election. Its lien assures that it will realize
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. II 1985).

45. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
46. See id.

47. 11 U.S.C. § I 111(b)(2) (1982). The election can only be made if the property has more
than inconsequential value and the property is not to be sold by the debtor. 11 U.S.C. §
11l(b(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (1982).
48. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1478 (1976) (cited by In re South Village, Inc., 25 B.R.
987, 999 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982), also citing Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R 8200 before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in the JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 704, 720-21 (1977)).
49. In re South Village, Inc., 25 B.R. 987, 999 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
50. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1111.02[5] (15th ed. 1979).
51. 124 CONG. REc. H11,103 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17,420 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2))A)(i)(II) (1982). This section requires that payments under
the plan aggregate at least the amount of the secured claim. The total payments, in the case
of election of § Il111(b)(2), must be at least as much as the unpaid debt as of the date of the
bankruptcy petition. Also, the present value of the plan payments must be at least as great
as the value of the collateral as of the effective date of the plan. If farmland declined to a
value of $500,000 but total debt was $1,000,000, this standard can still be met. Total payments during a plan term of 30 years , at 6%, on the $500,000 collateral value, exceed the
$1,000,000 unpaid debt amount.
53. In re South Village, 25 B.R. at 998-99.
54. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

1111.02[51 (15th ed. 1979).
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that appreciation. In essence, the creditor opts for potential appreciation
in collateral value rather than receiving payments on its unsecured claim.
This insures that the bankruptcy laws will be used only as a shield to pronot as a sword to enrich debtors at the secured creditors'
tect debtors,
55
expense.
Section 1 11 (b)(2) was discussed frequently in Chapter 12 legislative
hearings. Those in favor of excluding section 1111(b)(2) from Chapter 12
argued that farmland appreciation might be due to a farmer's personal
efforts.56 A co-drafter of the original House bill, Herbert Graves, testified that only an improvident lender would make the section 111 1(b) election. He argued that a lender will only realize appreciation in the future.
hard cash," on the unsecured portion of debt are
Plan payments, in "cold
5 7
a better substitute.
Provision proponents argued that this election should be a part of
Chapter 12 because lenders had once approved loans based on farmland
values. Victimized by deflation, the only fair thing was to allow lenders
the opportunity to share in future appreciation.58 Properly used, this section would prevent abuses by reorganizing farmers in the event that land
values rise.5 9 Its elimination would create a windfall to farmers.60
Congress chose to exclude the section 1111(b) election from Chapter
12. Although it gave no definite explanation for its action, it can be surmised that any farmland appreciation can only assist the farmer's financial recovery. This, though, leaves the once secured creditor with only its
collateral value for the secured claim amount, without an opportunity to
recover any losses from future appreciation.
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE

Chapter 11 also contains a specific provision that protects the unsecured creditor in cramdown. Section 1129(b)(2)(B) 6' requires the debtor to
pay all unsecured claims in full if the unsecured creditors object to the
plan and the debtor retains his property. Congress considered this protection while discussing Chapter 12 because the significant depreciation
in farmland values has created large unsecured portions of mortgage debt.
This Chapter 11 provision, part of the "fair and equitable ' 62 condition of cramdown, is called the Absolute Priority Rule. This reorganiza63
tion rule was judicially created in NorthernPacificRailway Co. v. BoydL
55. Id at 1 1111.02[1].
56. Anderson, supra note 3, at S15,086.
57. Hearings on H.R. 1397 and 1399, supra note 2, at 126.

58. Id at 40 (written statement of the American Bankers Assn.).
59. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedure, supra

note 1, at 57 (written statement of R. Stageman, Bankruptcy Judge, S.D. Iowa).
60. Anderson, supra note 3, at S15,085.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)42) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
63. 228 U.S. 482 (1913).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol23/iss1/8

6

Belcher: Cramdown under the New Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Boon
1988

COMMENTS

The United States Supreme Court held that the reorganization plan was
invalid because the former stockholders of the insolvent railroad retained
equity ownership in the reorganized business. The Court recognized that
former creditors should share in the value of the reorganized business before former equity owners could share.64 The Court modified its view in
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. 6 The Court stated that a
"fresh" contribution by the old equity owners, essential to the reorganization's success, would allow them to share in ownership of the reorganized67
business . 6 The new contribution must be "in money or money's worth"
and limits the new equity share to the equivalent value of that contribution.8
Congress modified the Absolute Priority Rule in Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The rule is now available only to a class
of unsecured creditors objecting to the plan.'9 This encourages the senior
and junior creditor classes to bargain for a mutually acceptable plan.
Senior creditors who advocate a plan may be willing to give up a small
amount of their plan payments to junior creditors, who would receive less
in a liquidation, to gain the junior creditors' votes favoring the plan. Senior
classes can give up this value as long as all objecting intervening classes
receive full payment. 0
Congress recognized that including the Absolute Priority Rule in
Chapter 12 would preclude the farmer from reorganizing because the farmer must retain ownership and possession of his farmland. 7' Farm reorganization cannot be accomplished unless the farmer retains possession of his
farm. Additionally, retaining the Absolute Priority Rule in Chapter 12
might make reorganization impossible for many farmers. It would require
full payment of all debt if the farmer were to retain possession of his farmland. Full debt repayment was impossible before Chapter 12 and is the
principal reason for Chapter 12's existence. The Absolute Priority Rule
would have rendered Chapter 12 useless to many farmers.
Congress eliminated the Absolute Priority Rule from Chapter 12. In
its place, Chapter 12 requires the debtor to dedicate his entire "disposable
income"72 to plan payments. This allows unsecured creditors to demand
that all the farmer's income, after paying business and personal expen64. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.03[21 (15th ed. 1979).
65. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
66. Id at 121.
67. Id at 122.
68. Id at 121.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982) (applies the "fair and equitable" test of a plan to only
a class of claims that is impaired and has not accepted the plan).
70. See 124 CONG. REC. H11,104-05 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17,421-22
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
71. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedure,supra
note 1, at 54 (written statement of R. Stageman, Bankruptcy Judge, S.D. Iowa).
72. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3111 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2))
("Disposable income" is income not necessary for support of the debtor or his dependents
and not necessary for business operations.).
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ditures, be applied to unsecured debt for three years." That is the limited
protection Congress gave to unsecured creditors, replacing the Absolute
Priority Rule in Chapter 11.
MODIFICATION OF DEBT SECURED BY THE DEBTOR'S PERSONAL RESIDENCE

Congress, in enacting Chapter 12, followed Chapter 13's general format. This was due to the simplicity of Chapter 13 and the expense of Chapter 11. 7' The Chapter 13 format, however, does not allow the debtor to
modify the debt secured by his principal residence.7 Section 1322(b)(2)
states that a plan can "modify the rights of holders of secured claims,
other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that
is the debtor's principal residence." (emphasis added)"6 The purpose of excepting the debtor's home-secured debt from modification is that allowing modification would affect residential home financing. Congress
approved this exception, recognizing that home mortgage lenders provide
a uniquely valuable social service.7 Because the typical Chapter 13 debtor's only long-term debt is his home mortgage, which cannot be modified,
he has no need to extend debt payments beyond the allowable three-year
term. Congress, accordingly, did not provide for it.
Congress recognized that farmers may have one mortgage that covers
7
both their home and farm even if the home is not located on the farm. 8
Farmers, more likely, live on their farm. 79 Disallowing mortgage debt
modification would preclude a successful reorganization. Because farmers cannot realistically pay their original mortgage debt, successful reorganization requires modification of, or "scaling down," this mortgage debt.
The same economic considerations apply to the length of repayment of
this debt. Realistically, a farmer cannot scale down his debt amount and
pay it within three years, the maximum plan term."
After considering the implications of these Chapter 13 provisions, Congress elected to change them in Chapter 12. Section 1222(b)(2"' allows
a debtor to modify all secured claims. Section 1222(b)(9)" allows modified
73. Id at 3110, 3112 (to be codified at II U.S.C. §§ 1222(c), 1228) (Section 1222(c) provides a maximum plan term of three years unless the court approves a longer period, not
to exceed five years. Section 1228 allows a discharge of all debt that is paid under the terms
of the plan.).
74. H. CON. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMiN. NEWS 5246, 5249.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
76. Id
77. Grubbs v Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1984).
78. H.R. REP. No. 178, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985).
79. Hearingson HR. 1397 and 1399, supranote 2, at 91 (written statement of H. Graves
that Oklahoma farmers, and many others, live on the land they farm).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1982) provides a maximum plan term of three years unless the
court extends it for cause, not to exceed five years. H.R. 1399 proposed a plan term of ten
years. Even that longer term was criticized as being too short for successful restructuring
of a farmer's long-term debt. Hearingson H.R. 1397 and 1399, supra note 2, at 77 (written

statement of G. Paine, II, Bankruptcy Judge, M.D. Tenn.).
81. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088,3109 (tobe codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1222(bH2)).
82. Id. at 3110 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(9)).
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debt payments to extend beyond the term of the plan if the plan meets
the standards for confirming a secured claim. Chapter 12 allows the farmer
to modify the amount and terms of his mortgage debt from that required
by his original loan. Further, plan payments can extend beyond the maximum three-year plan term. Farm mortgage lenders received no offsetting Chapter 12 protections. Apparently, Congress felt that non-farm
mortgage lenders provide a more valuable social service than do farm
lenders.
ANALYSIS

Economic considerations played a major role in the formation of Chapter 12 provisions affecting debt secured by farmland. Congress eliminated the Chapter 11 creditor protections granted through the section 1111 (b)
election and the Absolute Priority Rule. It also withdrew the special protection Chapter 13 gives to residential mortgage lenders. This suggests
that Congress is more concerned about the benefits Chapter 12 gives to
farmers than its detriment to farm lenders. The notion of "fairness" now
favors the farmer-debtor. " With this swing in the farmer's favor, the lender
can be expected to take actions to protect itself.
CHAPTER

12

PROTECTIONS

Section 1225 of Chapter 12, Confirmation of Plan, 84 closely follows section 1325 of Chapter 13. These sections allow plan confirmation only if
certain standards are met. First, the plan must comply with all applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 85 Next, all fees required to be paid
before plan confirmation must be pre-paid. 86 The plan must be lawful and
proposed in good faith.8 Also, an unsecured creditor must receive plan
payments having a present value not less than that it would receive if
the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7.88 None of those standards
will significantly differ when applied to a farmer in Chapter 12 as compared to Chapters 11 or 13. However, Chapter 12's debtor-oriented provisions give creditors more incentive to dispute plan feasibility, the amount
of their secured claims, and the proper discount rate to be applied to plan
payments.
Feasibility
In order for a plan to be confirmed, section 1225(a)(6) 81 requires the
bankruptcy court to find that a debtor can make all his plan payments.
This is true even if no creditor objects to the plan. This "feasibility" find83. 132 CONG. REC. S15,092 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini that
he feared Congress had tilted the pendulum too far in the direction of the farmer).
84. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3110-11 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1225).
85. Id. at 3110 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)).
86. Id. at 3111 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 12251a)(2)).
87. Id (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3)).
88. Id (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4)).
89. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3111 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(6)).
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ing is described as the most important confirmation criterion to promote
successful reorganizations." Its purpose is to prevent confirming a plan
which is only visionary and
promises payments which the debtor cannot
9
make after confirmation. '
Farm reorganization cases present some unusual characteristics.
Bankruptcy courts review many factors in evaluating a farm plan's feasibility. Historical yields, prices, and costs92 are primary factors while
weather and health problems 93 are also considered. Changes in the nature
of an operation 4 affects the feasibility determination. Even inflation during the plan term9" is considered. Many factors affecting a farmer's financial viability are outside his control. Most courts hold that optimism alone
will not overcome farming problems which could easily reappear."
One court, in In re Hines,91 sought to uphold its philosophy that the
Bankruptcy Code entitles a debtor to "at least one more chance for rehabilitation." 8 That court optimistically believed that the debtor's former problems, caused by bad weather and the grain embargo, would not
reappear. It found that the plan forecast sufficient income to make all
payments, assuming good weather, fair crop prices, and a market for crops.
Those factors were subject only to the providence of the Almighty.99 That
court failed to recognize the inherent risk in farming because many factors are outside the farmer's control. Confirming an optimistic plan only
delays a likely liquidation. Bankruptcy courts should follow the advice
of Bankruptcy Judge Richard Stageman, a participant in the hearings
on Chapter 12. Reorganization "is for restructuring, not resurrecting."1"
Creditors, whose plan protection comes largely from payments, will
closely scrutinize any plan. This is especially true for a lender secured only
by farmland, with no equity cushion and no assurance that farm values
have stopped declining. Courts reviewing plans which contain long-term
payouts have expressed the view that the longer the payout, the more
0
difficult it is to prove feasibility.'
' That prevents a debtor from speculat10 2
ing with a lender's funds.
90. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1325.07 (15th ed. 1979).
91. Id. at 1129.02111.
92. In re Cothran, 45 B.R. 836 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1984).
93. In re Shorten, 49 B.R. 722, 725 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985).
94. Id.
95. In re Barnes, 5 B.R. 376, 377 (Bankr. D.C. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 13 B.R.
997 (D. D.C. 1981).
96. See In re Shorten, 49 B.R. at 724.
97. 7 B.R. 415 (D. S.D. 1980).
98. Id. at 418-19.
99. Id. at 418.
100. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedure,supra
note 1, at 42.
101. In re White, 36 B.R. 199, 203-04 (Bankr. D. Ks. 1983).
102. Id. at 202 (citing In re 750 Ave. Assocs., 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 368, 371 (Bankr.

S.D. N.Y. 1979)).
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Allowed Amount of Secured Claim
Section 1225(a)(5)(B) provides standards for confirming a plan over
the objection of a secured lender.103 If the debtor intends to retain the collateral, the plan payments must have a value, as of the plan's effective
date, at least as great as the "allowed amount" of the claim.10 4 With section 1111(b) excluded from Chapter 12, the lender's secured claim amount
is governed exclusively by section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 506(a) states that a claim is secured to the extent of the value of the
property securing
the debt.0 5 Any balance above that value is an unse06
cured claim.1
Many farm mortgage lenders are "undersecured" because farmland
has depreciated to a point the lender has an unsecured claim. An undersecured lender has a great incentive to claim the highest value it can support for the farmland. Higher valuation requires higher plan payments
to meet the cramdown standards.0 7 In addition, the valuation establishes the lien amount retained by the lender. 0 8 This lien protects the lender
against future claims of other creditors against the collateral. Thus, an
objecting undersecured creditor will vigorously defend a collateral valuation.
Collateral may be valued at different stages in a bankruptcy case, with
a prior valuation having no binding effect on a later valuation. 0 9 This is
because collateral may be valued for different purposes during bankruptcy proceedings. 110 Two views express the purpose of valuation in a reorganization. The first is that valuation determines the amount a creditor
would receive if it liquidated the collateral. In Re Reeder"' held that valuation assures that a creditor will receive as much under the plan as it would
had it sold the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner."1 2 Under
this theory, the appropriate valuation measure is the liquida103. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3111 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(5)(B)).
104. Id (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii)).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
106. Id
107. Section 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) requires the present value of the plan payments to be not
less than the allowed amount of the secured claim, the value of the collateral under section
506(a). See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3111 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii)).
108. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3111 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(5)(B)(i)).
109. See H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963,6312; S. REP. No. 989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5854.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), for instance, requires "adequate protection" to be given to a creditor whose collateral may decrease in value. A valuation hearing
may be required to determine the protected amount. This collateral valuation is for a purpose different than that for plan confirmation.
111. 60 B.R. 312 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
112. Id at 314-15 (citing In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 873 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984)).
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tion value of the property."' Liquidation value is the fair market value
of the property less costs of sale and prior liens. That is the amount a
creditor would receive by disposing of property in a customary and commercially reasonable manner."'
The other theory of valuation is the replacement cost theory which
is based on retention and use of property." 5 Courts adopting this theory
premise valuation on the property's fair market value. 16 This is the
amount a debtor would pay for the property if he were to purchase it for
his business use. This theory arises from equitable principles. "[D]ebtors
cannot eat with the hounds and run with the hares. Seeking retention of
on liquidation values to be paid to the
the property, they cannot insist
7
creditor in installments.""1
These two theories indicate the wide discretion the Bankruptcy Code
vests in bankruptcy courts. Creditors will stubbornly argue that the correct theory is the replacement cost theory. If farmland has a fair market
value of $500,000.00, the costs of sale may approach $50,000.00. The
replacement cost theory disregards this sale cost amount in determining
the secured claim amount. The liquidation theory, however, treats the
$50,000.00 as an unsecured claim in the case of an undersecured creditor.
Under either theory, creditors will urge the highest fair market value they
can support. The high debt amounts for farm mortgages assures an extensive battle over farmland values.
Discount Rate
Section 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii)" 5 of Chapter 12 requires that the value of plan
payments made on a secured claim, as of the effective date of the plan,
be at least the amount of the secured claim. Thus, a bankruptcy court
must determine the present value of the proposed plan payments. The
purpose of the present value requirement is to put the secured lender in
the same economic position it would enjoy had the debtor exercised his
option to surrender collateral to the lender. Present value recognizes that
interest payments compensate the creditor for the delay the plan imposes
before the creditor is fully paid."9 The "discount rate" is the interest rate
required to compensate for this delay. "' Bankruptcy courts employ one
of two theories to reach the proper discount rate; the cost of money theory or the coerced loan theory.
113. See id at 314.
114. In re Paige, 13 B.R. 713, 714-15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
1980).
115. See In re Crockett, 3 B.R. 365, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
116. In re Yoder, 32 B.R. 777,779 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983),partialyrev'don othergrounds,
48 B.R. 744 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
117. In re Crockett, 3 B.R. at 367.
118. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3111 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(5)(B)(ii)).
119. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1325.06141[b][iii][B] (15th ed. 1979).
120. See id
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Proponents of the cost of money theory state that the purpose of the
discount rate is to compensate the creditor for its cost of money because
the creditor must wait to collect. The creditor obtains its cost to replace
funds for reinvestment.'2 ' By setting the discount rate at a creditor's cost
of money, the creditor neither profits nor suffers a loss from the delay. 2'
This same result is reached by courts which find that the discount rate
is a market loan rate less some factor for reduced risk.'
Advocates of the coerced loan theory claim that the creditor should
receive the same rate it would demand if making a similar loan to a third
party. This requires a discount rate equal to the market loan rate of that
imaginary similar loan.1"' Bankruptcy courts consider factors such as the
original contract rate, prospects for appreciation or depreciation in collateral value, and the risks inherent in long- term loans."' One court adopting the market loan rate stated that the purpose of reorganization is to
give the debtor a "fresh start." The debtor must pay the market loan rate
if he is to successfully emerge from bankruptcy and function normally

in the existing economy"1

As is true in valuation methods, the bankruptcy courts have no common approach for determining the proper discount rate. This determination is left largely to the bankruptcy judge's discretion. The difference
in plan payments on a secured claim can vary greatly with different discount rates. The difference in total payments on a $500,000.00 loan, payable over 30 years, with an interest rate of 9 1/2 percent instead of 8 1/2
percent, is $129,450.00. Lenders will unquestionably litigate the proper
discount rate with that much money at stake.
The protections once enjoyed by a lender in Chapter 11 or 13 are unavailable in Chapter 12. Their loss will sharpen both a lender's skill and
determination in objecting to a Chapter 12 plan. This is especially true
for a mortgage lender, which was once entirely secured by farmland and
is now partially unsecured due to drastic declines in farmland values. The
debtor can expect close scrutiny of a plan's feasibility, farm value, and
discount rate.
LENDER PROTECTIVE MEASURES OUTSIDE THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Chapter 12's enactment will affect the debtor-creditor relationship outside as well as within the context of bankruptcy proceedings. When assess121. In re Hardzog, 74 B.R. 701, 703 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987). This Chapter 12 case,
though, did recognize that some additional increment of interest should be allowed because

the creditor accepts some risk of default under the plan. Id at 704.

122. In re Moore, 29 B.R. 27, 28 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
123. In re O'Farrell, 74 B.R. 421, 424 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987). The creditor's risk is less

because bankruptcy relieves a debtor from paying part of his debts. Id
124. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.0314][i] (15th ed. 1979) (commenting on the proper discount rate in a Chapter 11 reorganization). COLLIER ' commentary on the proper discount rate in a Chapter 13 reorganization, however, advocates the cost of money approach.
Id at 1325.06[4][b][iii][BI).
125. In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336, 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).
126. In re Scovill, 18 B.R. 633, 634-35 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1988

13

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 23 [1988], Iss. 1, Art. 8
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIII

ing the risk of any loan, a lender focuses one eye on how the Bankruptcy
Code treats it if a borrower declares bankruptcy, a worst case event. Eliminating the section 1111(b) election limits a secured lender's protection
to the currentvalue of its collateral.12 The lender's protection is further
limited if it allows itself to become undersecured through declining collateral values. Chapter 12 requires only that a debtor pay "disposable
income "128 to unsecured creditors for three years 129 rather than comply
with Chapter I's Absolute Priority Rule. These changes will constantly
direct a lender's attention to a farmer's collateral value.
The debtor most likely to be impacted by this is the marginal farm
operator. He has survived the battered economic climate through wise
management or through a strong beginning capital base. His current financial condition is thin but solvent. His lender, however, will closely watch
collateral values. If farmland values stabilize and he suffers no losses, he
may survive. If values decline, the lender will initiate foreclosure actions
at the first loan default. Many agricultural lenders, suffering from their
own capital depletion, will have no choice but to take this action. Even
if forced liquidation is not required, lending policies may require a borrower to maintain an adequate equity cushion. Marginal borrowers will
be the first to feel the credit pinch because they have small equity cushions.
Should these possibilities occur, Chapter 12 may have given the insolvent
farmer, who is eligible for bankruptcy shelter, the upper hand for survival
at the expense of the solvent but marginal operator. Lenders' actions will
depend largely on the trend in farmland values.
Lenders, in addition to structuring loan policies to match their risk,
will take action to mitigate the huge potential losses Chapter 12 may fuel.
Creditors will likely raise loan prices by charging higher interest rates.
Since the largest farm lender is the Farm Credit System, 13 a borrowerowned lender, 3 ' this higher cost will be spread amongst many farm borrowers. The weak farmers, those behind Chapter 12's protective shield,
will again pass the cost of their hardship on to more viable operators.
Farm lenders are already capital poor due to the huge losses the weak
farm economy has inflicted on their borrowers and, ultimately, on them.
The federal government's massive involvement and encouragement of
farm lending precludes lenders' failure. A huge bailout is inevitable, costing
billions of dollars. 13 2 Chapter 12 did not create this crisis, but its bankrupt127. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
128. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088,3111 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
129. Id at 3111 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)).
130. See Comment, Chapter13 and the Family Farm, 3 BANER. DEv.J. 599, 603 (1986).
131. Id. at 605.
132. Less than one year after enactment of Chapter 12, the House is considering a bailout
of the Farm Credit System, a $55 billion network of borrower-owned banks that are the nation's largest farm lenders. The Farm Credit System suffered a loss of $4.8 billion in two
years and projects a $3 billion loss through the end of 1989. Casper Star-Tribune, Sept. 14,
1987, at 1, col. 5.
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cy encouraging provisions may expand it."3 Despite contentions that
Chapter 12 will cost not "one red cent,"'1 4 the American taxpayer will ultimately pay dearly to keep the farmer on the farm.
Chapter 12 is Congress' admitted band-aid"" to stop the bleeding from
a huge wound inflicted by harsh weather, grain embargoes, high interest
rates, and a multitude of other factors. Chapter 12 will give the farmer,
who can reorganize by complying with its provisions, a "fighting chance"
to stay on the farm. This supposedly benefits the American public through
increased competition and low food prices. 36 Saving the family farm
through Chapter 12 is absurd. The farmer's major problem is low prices.
Maintaining low prices only harms the still viable farm operator in an effort to save the insolvent operator.
During Chapter 12's pendency, Congress proposes to pass a new farm
bill and reassess trade and tax policies. This will supposedly "revitalize"
the farm economy.' 37 Congress admits its past legislation has failed to
produce a healthy farm economy. Although it expects to overcome those
failures, nothing could be further from the truth. Today's economy is international in scope. Any effort to legislate favorable farm trade conditions will be opposed by other special interest groups. Congress can neither
satisfy all these groups nor legislate a financially viable farm climate. Variables outside Congress' control (international politics, demand for foodstuffs, competing loan demand), preclude successful legislation. The
American farmer can produce more than the consumer demands. Until
this changes, low prices will continue, and farmers will suffer.
Chapter 12, though designed to be temporary, will have a permanent
effect on farm lenders. Private lenders may decide to reallocate loan
resources to other credit markets which are viewed as less risky. Public
lenders may continue their credit supplying role but require large public
funding.3 8 Some lenders may fail, causing significant financial loss to their
owners and great social cost to the communities they serve. Chapter 12
is a futile effort to support the farm sector. It only delays the exit of weak
operators from an overefficient goods-producing sector. Chapter 12's enticing environment for debt forgiveness places this burden squarely on
the lender without curing the underlying problem.
CONCLUSION

Chapter 12 excludes the protections Chapter 11 gives to a lender
through the section 1111(b) election and the Absolute Priority Rule. It
also excludes Chapter 13's special protection which denies a debtor the
133. 132 CONG. REC. S15,092 (daily ed.Oct. 3, 19861 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). The
Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court, D. Wyo., reported that fifty-three Chapter 12 cases had been
filed in Wyoming as of Aug. 11, 1987.
134. 131 CONG. REC. H4770 (daily ed. June 24, 1985) (statement of Rep. Synar).
135. Id at H4769.
136. Id at H4770.
137. Id at H4769.
138. The Wyoming Farm Loan Board, a public lender, is a creditor in sixteen Chapter
12 cases in Wyoming. Wyo. Farm Loan Board Report (May 19, 1987).
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right to modify claims secured by his personal residence. Chapter 12
represents a Congressional attitude specifically favoring the farm debtor. Proponents justify this legislation because farmers have special problems due to circumstances beyond their control, fueled by government
programs. Chapter 12 is billed as a temporary haven for insolvent farmers, giving them a "fighting chance" to stay on the farm while Congress
takes other steps to revitalize the farm economy.
In the meantime, secured lenders will seize every opportunity to protect themselves by opposing all defects in debtors' reorganization plans.
The greatest controversies concern plan feasibility, the amount of the
lenders' secured claims, and the discount rate applied to those claims. Creditors have a significant stake in these areas because of the reduced cramdown protection given to secured and unsecured claims. Mortgage lenders,
once fully secured by farmland but now only partially secured due to the
rapid decline in farmland values, are especially affected because they have
both secured and unsecured claims.
Chapter 12's existence may well change the lending policies of farm
lenders by increasing interest rates or reducing credit availability. The
victim may be today's marginal farm operator who has survived until now
but has little equity capital. Congress will undoubtedly propose additional legislation to assist the farmer, but the complexities of the international
marketplace present an insurmountable barrier to the legislation's success.
Chapter 12 only delays the liquidation of insolvent, weak producers
in an overcrowded industry. Its costly burden will fall directly on farm
lenders who will perish or be bailed out. Congress must, then, once again
deal with the staggering social and dollar cost of the farming sector.
JAMES
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